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The Swedish private venture capital sector is one of the key providers of funds and knowledge 
to emerging firms and thus crucial for these start-up firms success. However, due to a recent 
increase in perceived investment risk related to this segment, venture capitalists operating in 
the Swedish market are deserting the start-ups in favor of other segments. This has caused the 
overall private venture capital start-up investments and prospects made in the since 2011 to 
decrease severely, leaving the entrepreneurs with more unattractive funding options. 
 
In cases of similar shifts in the market, fund managers who address the phenomenon suggest a 
potential coherence between the drivers of incomplete contractual obligations and the direct 
risks of the funds. The potential coherence is said to be more significant in the case of innovative 
firms, which would explain the shift to some extent. The idea of coherence has also been 
addressed by previous research, however, a real connection has yet to be proven. This thesis 
aims to examine the presence as well as the strength of this potential coherence, which in turn 
may offer explanatory value to what extent contractual agreements could aid managers of both 
venture capital funds as well as entrepreneurs in their efforts to negate risks. 
 
In order to address the purpose of the study, we chose to conduct an inductive case study of a 
number of investments made in the Swedish start-up segment by private venture capital from 
2010 to 2013. The case study resulted in eight primary arguments, three of which addressed 
contractual agreement and five related to the funds’ investment risk. These arguments were 
structured and analyzed based on contractual- and agency theory. The analysis revealed that 
there was a strong coherence between the drivers of incomplete contracts and risks experienced 
by the funds post-investment. We argue that this coherency might offer explanatory value to 
events like the previously mentioned drop in investments on the Swedish market. Lending 
support to both venture capital managers and entrepreneurs in creating more viable contractual 
agreements, which will also reduce risk and increase the willingness to invest in this sector. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to acquaint the reader with the Swedish venture capital market and its relation to 
entrepreneurial ventures. In addition to this, identified problems and focus is presented in a 
comprehensive manner aimed at addressing the target audience. 
1.1 Background 
Due to the global financial crisis and the burst of the IT-bubble, the beginning of the twenty-
first century may be referred to as a “troubled decade” for the Swedish private venture capital 
market. Venture capital funds have suddenly found themselves in a harsher environment with 
periods of declining returns and severe exposure to investment related risk (SVCA, 2014). The 
recent experiences has left the private venture capital sector with a severe risk-averse attitude 
towards investing in the higher-risk start-up segment. A report published by the Swedish 
business community, Svenskt näringsliv, strengthens this idea by indicating an increased 
reluctance towards investments targeting innovative start-ups (Svenskt näringsliv, 2013). In 
addition, the Swedish venture capital community’s (2013) latest report indicates that there are 
signs of a deteriorating trend regarding investments made since 2010. Particularly subjected to 
this trend are the innovative start-ups. Rydlinger (interviewed 25 Mars 2014), venture capital 
fund manager and entrepreneur, argues that these companies has fallen out of favor due to the 
initial yield-assessment that venture capitalists conduct pre-investment. 
1.1.1 Introduction to the Venture Capital Funds Yield Assessments 
In general, venture capitalists use many different assessment-tools in order to determine if an 
investment opportunity is viable. According to Talborn (interviewed 8 April 2014), chief 
economist at SVCA, it comes down to one simple equation which provides the investor with a 
single figure to a complex question, whether or not to invest. 
√𝐸(1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) × 𝐸(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)
𝑡(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
Where E(return) is the expected return of a successful investment, E(risk) is an assessment of 
the variables affecting the general security of investment made. This is often conducted on an 
arbitrary- or template basis and t(years) is the estimated time until exit. The following example 
illustrates the use of this equation; an IT-startup investment has a 200 % return potential and 
the risk level is estimated to 20 % (suggesting that the estimated chance of success is 80 % (100 
% - 20 %)) the time span is set to 5 years. 
√𝐸(80%) × 𝐸(200%)
𝑡(5)
 ≈ 10% 
In this particular example, a portfolio of several similar companies would have an expected 
return of 10 % a year. Which may be compared to other investment alternatives, indicating the 
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particular opportunities relative viability. In order to derive the numbers from the equation, the 
investor must estimate the variables of which the risk-coefficient is deemed the most difficult 
variable to assess (Talborn, interviewed 8 April 2014). This makes investors keen to adopt a 
cautious approach when addressing the risk-variable and its underlying components. The 
impact of the risk variable is particularly evident in the case of venture capital demography. 
1.1.2 The Shifting Demographics of Venture Capital 
As the private venture capital is deserting the Swedish market, govermental intervention in the 
shape of public venture capital increases in order to fill the gap (Exhibit 1.1). Despite being 
subjected to the same market conditions as private venture capital, public venture capital is 
allowed to operate with differing yield expectations. This enables these actors to make 
investments with a higher degree of risk, which allows them to operate in the segments deserted 
by the private venture capital. Siewertz (interviewed 1 April 2014), CEO of Vestigum AB - 
funding venture capital, argues that public venture capital differs in several regards. These are 
primarely knowledge and business connections, traits of whom makes entrepreneurs more keen 
on acquiring private venture capital. Lööf and Bäckman (2014), both members of the Swedish 
parilment, state that public capital may only act as a temporary fix and should not be considered 
a long-term alternative. Hence, the Swedish market as well as the start-ups are dependent on 
private venture capital funds return. 
Exhibit 1.1 Private- and Public Venture Capital Initial Investments 
 
Source: SCVA report 2013.1 
  
                                                          
1 Please note the one year lag in the chart; events occurred in Q4 2011 results in investments in Q4 2012 
Y-axis: Billion SEK 
X-axis: Time 
Public VC 
Private VC 
Private VC trend 
Public VC trend 
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1.2 Problem Outline 
As accounted for above, an increased reluctance by private venture capital to provide necessary 
funding to innovative start-ups is threatening to damage the sector, leaving entrepreneurs with 
other, less unattractive financing-options (Svensson, 2011). If permitted to continue, the trend 
threatens to further contribute to what Colombo & Grilli (2007) refers to as “the funding gap”, 
which may prevent business opportunities for these start-ups. This phenomenon of investment 
reluctance, experienced by the Swedish innovative start-ups is not unique. It has been 
scientifically addressed previously in cases regarding similar situations. In their thesis 
concerning this very subject, Young & Runhka (1991) argue that a general shift in the funds 
risk variables is the primary cause of this sort of trend. Suggesting that the situational state of 
low returns, partly due to external factors, gives rise to a risk-averse approach among investors. 
According to Reuer et al. (2006), contractual complexity in these often very high-tech 
companies makes binding agreements, as a mean of hedging the risks incurred, less viable. 
Hence, the ability to reduce risks using contractual means is not possible due to the problems 
associated with creating viable contractual agreements. The increased risk equals to a lower 
yield variable in the yield assessment-equation, making the fund unwilling to invest. 
 
Strömsten & Waluszewskis (2012) further agree with the claim that contractual complexity 
might offer explanatory value in this regard. Suggesting that the implications of setting up 
contractual agreements with innovative start-ups in general may result in an elevated risk on 
the venture capitalists behalf. The elevated risk is said to be a result of an “incomplete contract” 
or a contract which is not able to regulate important post-investment events. Jeng & Wells 
(2000) thesis agrees with the previous rationale, specifically pointing towards the possible 
problems resulting from the presence of incomplete contracts. They argue that e.g. inability to 
practice necessary control as well as conflicting wills are contractually-preventable issues. 
Furthermore, Jeng & Wells (2000) questions whether the venture capital funds should stop 
focusing on addressing the direct risks head on. Instead, they propose the funds to reduce the 
contractual problems, which in turn may also decrease their direct risk exposure. Thus resulting 
in a higher expected yield, to the degree of which contractual- and direct risks correlate, which 
would in turn increase the attractiveness of these firms. 
1.2.1 Problem Discussion 
As accounted for above, the previous studies conducted within this field suggests a connection 
between the risk and drivers of incomplete contractual agreements, especially in the case of 
venture capital funds and their relation to the target firms. Also worth noticing is that the studies 
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emphasize contractual agreements as one of the root causes of which gives rise to direct risks 
on the funds behalf. This would be a highly relevant concern within the industry. However, no 
study directly aims to or has yet to prove the actual connection between the two factors 
discussed, nor has this possible connections magnitude been assessed. Based on the question 
regarding contractual focus, raised by Jeng & Wells (2000), we argue that a study of which 
could prove or disprove a connection would offer significant explanatory value. Not only 
regarding the demographic shifts, but also in which ways venture capital fund managers may 
better understand the notion of investment related risks. It would also contribute to the previous 
studies conducted, partly unleashing their value by enhancing or weakening their claims. The 
potential findings of the study suggested will most likely also apply to the specifics in previous 
studies, especially concerning contractual implications and the specific direct risks and their 
individual relationships. Furthermore, bridging this gap in previous research may also lend aid 
to the actors involved, primarily the funds and the start-up firms. As they will be able to make 
better decisions and allocate resources to prevent investment-related risk based upon a higher 
degree of certainty of the outcome. That is, whether reducing contractual errors will reduce risk 
or not. To enable us to accurately address the problem at hand, the following purpose and 
research questions have been formulated. 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
This thesis aims to explore the fundamental reasons for the private venture capital funds 
reluctance towards investments in innovative start-ups by addressing the underlying contractual 
agreements. It seeks to lend empirical support to the current scientific debate as well as 
increasing the general understanding of the contractual implications relation to direct risk. 
Offering guidance to whether contractual implications should be addressed by managers of 
funds and target-firms in order to reduce direct investment-related risk. From this purpose, the 
primary research question is derived; 
 
To what extent do the implications of creating contractual agreements with entrepreneurs 
affect the direct risk of the venture capital funds? 
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To further isolate the different aspects affecting the main question and support the structure of 
the thesis, the following four sub-questions have been prepared: 
 
1) Which factors affect the quality of the contractual obligations with innovative start-ups? 
2) To what extent are these factors causing issues in the contracts created by venture capital 
funds? 
3) Which implications may originate from a lack of contractual prevention? 
4) How impactful are these implications in relation to the direct risks of the venture capital 
funds? 
 
1.4 Target Audience 
Despite the focus being on the perspective of the venture capital funds targeting start-up firms, 
the target audience of this study can be broadened to include the managers of start-ups as well 
as venture capital funds with similar investment strategies. Supporting their understanding of 
contractual implications indirect impact regarding investment risk and the risk assessment 
process. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
Opening the chapter is an account of the previous research, upon which the study is grounded. 
Thereafter, detailed accounts on contractual theory and agent theory as well as their relation to and 
possible implication for the firm follows. Summed up by a theoretical discussion, tying back to the 
purpose of the thesis. 
2.1 Previous Research 
Although venture capital funds have long since operated in high-risk segments, research 
regarding contracts and their connection to the funds risk-variable is quite limited. Partly 
complementing the previous studies discussed in our problem outline above, this chapter 
address a total of four studies, of which claims with somewhat contradictory results. Strömsten 
& Waluszewskis (2012) thesis, concerning the relationship between the venture capital funds 
and bio-tech companies, suggests that incomplete contractual agreements may reflect on the 
direct risk of the fund to a large extent. Proposing that only a minority of the ventures 
undertaken could be regarded as entirely successful, or free from risk-increasing implications 
arising from pre-investment activities. In addition to this, the authors point towards certain 
implications occurring more often, such as objective differentials, in the process of interaction 
between the venture capital fund and the bio-tech company post-investment. Jeng & Wells 
(2000) study, surveying venture capital conditions in 21 countries, lends support to this idea by 
claiming that implications post-investment are likely to occur, if there are insufficient 
preventive actions pre-investment. Interestingly enough, they also debate whether standardized 
contracts in particular might be one of the prime causes of risk-increasing implications in 
general. 
 
Hellmann & Puri’s (2000) thesis, regarding start-ups in Silicon Valley, further elaborates on 
this by revealing a number of implications arising from pre-investment mistakes. The more 
extensive ones being replacement of senior management and quarrels regarding objectives of 
the firm. However, their findings are not uncontested as Triantis (2001) explores the contractual 
aspects of venture capital funds relation to start-ups in his article “Financial Contract Design in 
the World of Venture Capital”. Supporting the thesis that contractual or pre-investment 
mistakes might affect the business relationship but seemingly disagreeing on the specific 
implications. Triantis (2001) argues that parties are willing and very capable of solving issues 
arising from contractual shortcomings, which would indicate that the contractual implications 
effect on the venture capital funds risk-variable are minor. 
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The research presented above is primarily based upon examining either the contractual- or the 
risk implications experienced by venture capital funds. In order to extend their findings while 
directly addressing our own specific research question, there was a need to incorporate both of 
the previous aspects. Hence, the theoretical base includes specific theory covering each of the 
two areas. That is contractual theory and principal-agent theory, aimed at explaining both the 
contractual implications and the post-investment risks experienced by the funds. 
2.2 Contractual Theory 
Contractual theory is closely tied to organizational theory and theories regarding interactions 
between parties, often investors (principals) and entrepreneurs (agents). It is argued that 
contract theory offers explanatory value regarding the reduction of problems arising from the 
interactions within business relationships (Cestone, 2001). However, writing contracts may also 
be afflicted by issues. In an article published by Kaplan & Strömberg (2001), the authors 
address contractual implications and primary the limitations of using contracts in a principal-
agent relationship in the case of venture capital funds and entrepreneurs. They put forth three 
main obstacles which are preventing complete contracts between parties, these are transaction 
costs, bounded rationality and asymmetric information. They argue that an extensive presence 
of these factors may cause the contractual obligations to become too standardized. Therefore 
lacking the necessary detail and adaptation needed to prevent the problems which Cestone 
(2001) addresses, such as misunderstandings and disagreements between parties. 
2.2.1 Transaction Costs 
Costs that arise from economical exchange, such as conducting business with other actors are 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). The phenomenon may be divided into two smaller 
components, which characterizes a certain timespan within the process of doing business; 
namely before- and during contracting. These are labeled; information costs and bargaining 
costs (Williamson, 1979). 
2.2.1.1 Information Costs 
When striking a business deal, the contract will often be preceded by extensive examination of 
the different components involved (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). In the case of venture capital, this 
would be the due diligence process.2 The costs resulting from such an investigation often 
involves a substantial commitment of time and money, costs of which may not be recoverable 
(Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). Fama (1980) debates this in his paper “Agency Problems and the 
Theory of the Firm” in which he argues that  information is crucial to success in the early stages 
                                                          
2 The due diligence process is a full review of the target firm, including legal, financial and operational aspects. 
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of a principal-agent relationship. However, the information required is often expensive to 
obtain, which discourages investors, which may even be tempted to disregard the necessity of 
making an informed decision. Instead basing it on standardized- or template grounds or 
reducing other costs significantly (Fama, 1980). 
2.2.1.2 Bargaining Costs 
The most critical element in creating a complete contractual agreement is the negotiation 
between the investor and agent (Lowry, 1976). However, the costs incurred as a result of this 
phase might be extensive, especially regarding time-commitment. These costs vary depending 
on the extent of the deal, whether it concerns investments or purchases and which industry the 
parties operate within (Lowry, 1976). Argyres & Liebeskind (1999) addresses this 
phenomenon, in which they define the costs as reaching the middle ground between the initial 
bid and ask. They argue that investors often run a standardized form of bargaining, holding 
substantial bargaining power in contrast to the entrepreneur, this minimizes costs as well as the 
time committed. However, the standardized deal might suffer from lack of coherence and 
adaptation, which forces an increased monitoring presence post-contracting (Argyres & 
Liebesking, 1999). 
2.2.2 Bounded Rationality 
This potential obstacle suggests that the rationality of humans are limited by the information 
they possess. Hence, making an optimal decision is not always possible due to e.g. limitations 
concerning the parties’ knowledge of future development, limited time and intellect (Radner, 
1996). Therefore, according to Radner (1996), overweighing uncertainty will reduce parties’ 
willingness to enter into binding agreements due to perceived risk being too great in comparison 
to the potential gain. Furthermore, in order to make a decision, a manager might risk simplifying 
the decision to an extent which displaces the information basis of the decision, leading to the 
manager making a choice based on chance instead of facts (Radner, 1996). Hence, complexity 
– both perceived and real – might cause the parties to ignore including important paragraphs in 
their binding contracts. Radner (1996) illustrates this by comparing it to the legal dispute 
settlement body, which often deals with interpretation of contractual agreements. As shown, in 
the cases where the parties disagree on the contractual obligations the causes are often 
disagreements originating from a lack of information pre-contract. Due to this risk of generality 
in contracts, parties might be tempted to create too detailed contracts or disregard them 
altogether (Radner, 1996). 
Wågerman & Danielsson 2014 
9 
2.2.3 Asymmetric Information 
Information asymmetry occurs when one of the contracting parties has an information 
advantage in relation to her counterpart (Chiappori & Salanié, 2000). This enables the informed 
actor to deceive the other part and thereby attain more favorable contractual terms. Chiappori 
& Salanié (2000) argues that this advantage may arise on both sides of the principal-agent 
relationship, however, principals are perceived as more keen to avoid being deceived. This 
reluctance may result in unnecessary investigations of the agent’s available information or 
contracts containing too detailed paragraphs, threatening to harm the relationship in the long 
run (Chiappori & Salanié, 2000). 
 
Sharpe (1990) illustrates the asymmetric information phenomenon by observing lenders’ 
interaction with their target segments. In which the lenders obtain an information advantage on 
their counterparts, in turn enabling them to negotiate more favorable terms and establish a 
lenders market. This forces the borrowers into a race to the bottom, knowingly agreeing to 
unfavorable terms to beat their competitors. This phenomenon is due to the other party’s 
inability to make an informed decision to the same extent as the lender (Sharpe, 1990). 
Contrasting this, Trester (1998) illustrates the agent’s information advantage in his article 
“venture contracting under asymmetrical information”, demonstrating the phenomenon applied 
to the principal-agent relationship. He proposes that one party - often the agent - possesses more 
information regarding e.g. the company of interest and its possible faults. In denying to provide 
the principal (venture capital fund) with sufficient information, agents might acquire funds and 
benefits which they would not have received if the principal had a similar degree of information. 
Therefore, venture capitalists must be cautious in agreeing to specific terms pre-investment 
(Trester, 1998). 
2.3 Principal-Agent Theory 
Complementing contractual theory, which focuses on the pre-investment phase, the principal-
agent theory elaborates on the commercial relationship between the principal (investor) and the 
agent (entrepreneur) post-investment. It aims to explain how the agent’s actions and choices 
affect the principal. The theory lends support to the notion that entrepreneurs will not always 
act in the best interest of their investors, thereby giving rise to risks and problems on the 
principal’s behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The model has been further developed to include 
several different aspects, which are suggested to affect the agent’s behavior and its 
consequences. These aspects are presented below. 
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2.3.1 Adverse Selection 
Akerlof (1970) launched the idea of “qualitative uncertainty” or adverse selection in his article 
“the market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanisms”. He argues that a 
business relationship between e.g. investor and investee is afflicted by unfair information. 
Whereas one actor possesses more information regarding a specific set of transaction objectives 
(Akerlof, 1970). This gives rise to contractual advantages both pre-contracting in the form of 
information asymmetries but also post-contracting, which is Akerlof’s (1970) primary focus. 
He argues that the information advantages makes the lesser informed part unable to detect 
whether their better informed business partner is deceiving them. This notion is especially 
present in knowledge-based industries, where sharing information with external parties may be 
fatal. Levin (2001) elaborates on Akerlofs argument, claiming that the presence of adverse 
selection in the market will inevitably result in a general reluctance to conduct business within 
the segments afflicted by the phenomenon. The reasoning which is underlining the argument is 
that the lesser informed part’s potential risk of a venture increases proportionally to the 
information gap between the parties (Levin, 2001). 
 
Adverse selection might be present in any business relationship, but has a very strong presence 
in the principal-agent relation (Cumming, 2006). He argues that managers of smaller firms often 
have the opportunity of tricking their investors since the nature of the small firm gives rise to a 
secretive approach with little or no published information regarding its business activities. 
Hence, managers of small companies has a greater information advantage in comparison to 
larger firms, as they are obligated to notify external share and stakeholders to a greater extent 
(Cumming, 2006). In addressing the venture capital fund relations towards entrepreneurs in the 
principal-agent context, he suggests that the venture capitalists themselves may prevent the 
adverse selection by conducting a thorough examination of the target firm. However, this 
review might prove ineffective due to the agent’s incentives to shirk or hide essential 
information in order to maintain the information disadvantages (Cumming, 2006). The adverse 
selection phenomenon might therefore result in the investor venturing into a relationship 
without proper backing. Being unable to base the expected return and general contractual 
agreements on an accurate risk-variable might prove to be fatal (Akerlof 1970, Cumming, 
2006). 
2.3.2 Moral Hazard 
Mirrlees (1999) states that investments aimed at the agent firm increases the chance of the agent 
adopting a more risk-affine approach. This issue arises due to the relatively lesser stake that the 
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agent carries in comparison to before the investment has been made. Due to risk-diversification, 
losses will also have lesser impact on the actors’ individual wealth (Mirrlees, 1999). To 
illustrate the issue, he points towards a strong correlation between insured individuals risk-
affine behavior in contrast the risk-averse behavior of the uninsured. Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
suggest that a lack of monitorial capabilities gives rise to the moral hazard situation. Claiming 
that possibilities to fully monitor the agent will offer full prevention of the issue. However, due 
to the practical difficulties involved, the principal must instead rely upon contractual 
agreements and reasonable monitoring, which do not completely prevent the phenomenon 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Besides increasing the agent’s willingness to gamble with the 
available funds, he or she might also be inclined to spend more on activities that have a weak 
correlation with corporate success (Mirrlees, 1999). Expenditure involving managerial benefits 
and prestige purchases are more likely to increase in relation to available funds and financier 
(Mirrlees, 1999). 
2.3.3 Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicting wills give rise to an underlying conflict-risk that may result in disagreements 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhart, 1989). These conflicts of interest may give rise 
to serious problems regarding corporate activities, e.g. by halting production, R&D or sales. 
Eisenhart (1989) claims that the “conflict state” in the principal-agent relationship is to be 
considered the natural state due to the principal’s direct interest seldom corresponds with the 
agents. She argues that the most troublesome aspect of these conflicts occur when the principal 
is investing funds into the agent’s business. In which the principal becomes influential and not 
just monitoring, shifting the balance of power. The situation described illustrates the most basic 
of conflicts, the one between long-term and short-term yield. The investor allocates funds based 
on an investment horizon that is severely shorter than the agent’s. Hence, paying dividends to 
shareholders or selling the venture might be short-term profitable but hurt the firm in the long 
term, which motivates the agent to oppose such a proposal, risking conflicts of interest as a 
result (Eisenhart, 1989). 
 
Kaplan & Strömberg (2001) elaborates on the thesis that conflicts in investor-entrepreneur 
relations is exposed to conflict-risk. They suggest that venture capitalists may use contractual 
obligations as safeguards to ensure that these conflicts can be prevented (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2001). However, there are severe difficulties involved in creating a contractual obligation that 
offers full protection on both parties’ behalf. In addition, Kaplan & Strömberg (2001) argue 
that conflicts may also arise from sources other than monetary ones, in the shape of personal 
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disagreements or conflicting values and beliefs, which are also supported by Eisenhart (1989). 
Hence, venture capital funds should also consider the agents personal attributes before entering 
into a business relationship (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2001). 
2.3.4 The “hold up” Phenomenon 
Goldberg (1976) identified how the parties in the principal-agent relationship would avoid to 
cooperate, even though this would lead to the optimal outcome for both parties. Goldberg 
(1976) argues that this “hold up” phenomenon was due to the parties’ reluctance to increase 
their partners influence and thereby reducing their own. In the principal-agent relation, every 
commitment is to be considered as a “sunk cost”, without any possible way of recovering the 
money or time spent. Therefore, investments made by either the principal (money) or the agent 
(work-effort) in the firm makes it possible for the other part to refuse to match the investment 
made (Goldberg, 1976). If the principal were to invest funds to find that the agent was not 
willing to commit his time. The agent would “hold up” the venture, having increased bargaining 
power due to the principal’s inability to regain the investment made (Goldberg, 1976). 
 
Bolton & Dewatripont (2005) addresses the “hold up” phenomenon in relation to capital 
investments and contractual mitigation efforts, suggesting that contracts offer substantial 
protection if constructed pre-phenomenon. The major implication in this regard is that one 
might be unable to consider the issue before it is too late. Making any contractual means useless 
(Bolton & Dewatripont, 2005). 
2.4 Theoretical Discussion 
The theoretical framework presented will be used as a base for carrying out our segmented 
analysis. Contractual theory addresses the first set of sub-research questions (1-2) and provides 
a broad base for analysis of the initial contractual reluctance presented by fund managers 
(chapter 4.1). Succeeding this initial framework, aimed at extending the analysis by applying 
the principal-agent theory to the second sub-set of research questions (3-4). The results derived 
from each part of the analysis will be used to identify possible linkages between them. Enabling 
us to evaluate the two sub-set of research questions explanatory value on our primary research 
question and purpose. 
 
However, one must also recognize the potential weaknesses in the theoretical framework 
presented. We realize that the theories applied will not serve to explain all the possible pre-
contractual implications or post-contractual problems that may exist. Therefore, the reader 
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should be mindful of other potential factors than the ones addressed in this thesis, factors which 
might impact the actual outcomes of the sub-research questions. Despite this, we argue that the 
issue is minor due to the lack of other significant issues identified in previous research, and the 
fact that the pre-study, carried out in order roughly map the issues, showed no signs of other 
implications or problems. Furthermore, the theories presented in this thesis offer high value but 
limited range. Therefore, specifics may be analyzed in depth, yet it also requires our empirical 
data to be precise. Although, we argue that this very specific theoretical methodology must be 
applied in order to accurately address our primary research question and the purpose of the 
thesis. This conviction is based on that these demand specific accounts regarding exact 
implications and problems and their presence in each case. If we were to disregard this, a 
comparison of implications and factors affecting risk in the cases examined will not be possible. 
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3. Method 
This chapter elaborates on the methodological approach of the thesis and introduces the various aspects 
of the study, including literature- and respondent specifics. The rationale underlying the analysis and 
methodological criticism concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Type of Study 
In order to address the purpose of the study we required detailed accounts on specific events, 
such as data regarding the implications related to contracts and investments. Hence, we chose 
to conduct our thesis on the basis of the case study. A case study is a viable method when 
uncovering specifics, in addition, the methods explanatory value increases with the number of 
cases investigated (Jacobsen 2002). Due to the investments of private venture capital being the 
target of this study, and the fact that prospective investment have declined substantially during 
the past years, the case study was conducted on retrospective grounds. 
3.2 Methodical Choice 
As our study aimed to uncover the reasoning which gives rise to the venture capital companies’ 
reluctance regarding investments in particular start-ups, we aimed to obtain specific and 
detailed data. This resulted in adopting a more explorative and inductive perspective. An 
inductive approach enables the researcher to draw conclusions from data which has been 
collected without conditional restrictions (Wallén, 1996). Hence, an inductive method does not 
limit the researcher to a certain set of theories when collecting the empirical data. In addition 
to this, our inductive methodology enabled us to present more general conclusions on the basis 
of separate pieces of data, which is the very core of a case study (Andersen, 1998). 
 
A subject or phenomenon may, in theory, be studied in two ways: through qualitative research 
or quantitative research. The qualitative method aims to obtain a more in depth understanding 
of a certain phenomenon by asking how- and why- type questions aimed at intangible values 
(Andersen, 1998). Because our study required us to understand the behavior and thought 
processes of venture capital managers’ and analysts, intangibles must be accounted for. The 
other approach, quantitative method, should be carried out to grasp general patterns but may 
also be used to underline and support the qualitative study to contrast the qualitative data 
(Wallén, 1996). Therefore, our study addresses the purpose of the thesis through qualitative 
methodology underlined and summarized by means of quantitative and numerical data. This 
method adds to the depth of the study, enabling us to examine the phenomenon from additional 
perspectives (Wallén, 1996). The main reasoning behind selecting this combined approach was 
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that our theoretical framework encouraged us to view the problems of the study from multiple 
angles in order to determine the presence and magnitude of each problem area. 
3.3 Background Study 
The base of this thesis was first mapped by conducting a pre-study. In which we carried out 
interviews with faculty members as well as six venture capital managers (Annex 3) to narrow 
our scope towards a specific subject. This initial stage is necessary in order to assess the scale 
and suitability of the project (Jacobsen 2002). By asking about their experiences with 
contractual- and risk-driving implications, we were able to derive eight arguments which 
supported us in determining the specifics of the questionnaire presented to procure our 
empirical data. Parallel to this, we conducted a directed review of the literature in order to 
increase our understanding of the field in general as well as the previous research more in depth. 
In addition, a general literature review aimed at revealing the area of interest was carried out. 
The purpose of these two reviews were to broaden our knowledge to include several different 
perspectives and therefore minimize the risk of bias, which might in turn undermine the study 
(Yin, 2007). Hence, a wide range of literature was browsed, including consulting reports, 
venture capital managers’ statements, and publications by members of the faculty. 
3.4 Literature Study and Choice of Theory 
Our background study was then further developed into a full literature study. Initially, previous 
research was reviewed in more detail. This was aimed at reducing errors in outlining the 
required empirical- and theoretical base that previous researchers might have encountered 
(Thurén, 2004). After this initial stage was carried out, we established a theoretical framework 
for our thesis. This was done by reviewing related literature and scientific articles of which 
were directed at the purpose and objective of the thesis. The theories were partly chosen based 
on the expected explanatory value they would offer regarding the eight implications identified 
in the pre-study, but mainly to which extent they matched the purpose of the study. In both 
stages, the primary platforms were scientifically oriented databases, such as GU-library and 
Google Scholar. A sample of the search words used follows; venture capital and contracts, 
funding start-ups, contractual implications, and investor relationships. The librarians at 
Ekonomiska biblioteket as well as Kurs- och tidningsbiblioteket were also consulted to provide 
us with additional literature on the subject. 
3.5 Empirical Base and Data Collection 
Our thesis is conducted on the basis of face-to-face interviews with analysts of private venture 
capital funds as well as telephone- and supplementary email correspondence. The interview 
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procedure was semi-structured, conducted partly on the basis of pre-set questions and interview 
guide, Annex 2. The objective of this approach was to enable the interviewee to elaborate on 
events and practices in their field with an extensive degree of independence while at the same 
time following a pre-set path. These aspects were of great significance during our interview-
stage, due to the risk of bias in qualitative interview answers put forth by Yin (2007).  
 
Due to our specific target of innovative start-ups, we approached the venture capital funds 
operating in this segment. The respondents were chosen based on the case-profile, namely size-
, stage of development- and degree of innovation, used to align empirical base with the research 
questions. The selection of cases was largely carried out in cooperation with fund-managers, 
which provided us with a random set of cases to consider. Therefore, the interviewed analysts 
as well as the innovative-start-ups were selected on an arbitrary basis which gave us a 
randomized sample. A randomized sample was considered essential due to Thurén’s (2004) 
claims regarding the increased applicability of randomized samples. Hence, we were keen to 
avoid just addressing a specific fund or size of target-firm, as it might have distorted the data. 
Leading us to present a niched and less general picture of the innovative start-up segment, which 
would not have been acceptable based on the thesis underlying purpose. The data collected 
from these interviews were processed through an initial categorization in which we segmented 
the entire body of data under the initial arguments derived from the pre-study. This, more 
complete, semi-segmented structure then enabled us to conduct a selective screening of the 
data, in which a compressed version was produced. The process of screening was deemed 
necessary due to the large quantity of data assembled but also enabled us to better adjust it to 
our theoretical base. 
3.6 Applied Analysis 
Based on the segmented data derived from the interviews, we used our theoretical base to 
identify the root causes of our initial sub-questions and further divide the data into smaller 
fragments. This made it possible for us to derive the specifics of the empirical base and match 
them with our theoretical framework to assess whether they fulfilled the criteria of contractual- 
or risk-driving implications. The data was first processed individually by each author, in which 
we concluded whether each case was afflicted by the implications targeted by the study. This 
was followed by a discussion in which we established the specifics in each case. The style of 
execution applied in our analysis was largely based on the pre-set structure of the theoretical 
base, emphasizing its relation to the sub-research questions of the study, addressing a sub-set 
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of questions at a time. This approach is advocated by Jacobsen (2002) because it secures the 
analysis consistency in relation to our overall objective, preventing any unnecessary aspects 
from being addressed to the extent possible. The joint analysis discussion comprised of two 
separate parts, each one addressing a sub-set of research questions in numerical order. In the 
first segment part we established the current contractual practices within the industry. Hence, 
the analysis focused on the reports from the venture capital funds analysts. Whereas the second 
segment part focused on deriving the actual outcome of the relationship between the capital 
fund and the entrepreneur. Which in turn forced us to partly look beyond the analysts’ view and 
instead consider the actual events presented by them. The analysis was then concluded by 
deriving the general contractual-direct risk connections of the analyzed data, upon which an 
assessment regarding whether our findings could be deemed as plausible followed. In this 
regard we first discussed the findings with selected members of the faculty (Björn Sandén) and 
compared and discussed the findings in relation to the previous research. 
3.7 Evaluation of Method 
Because our study is conducted primarily upon qualitative basis, with quantitative method used 
only to segment and present components to a lesser degree, we have chosen to primarily address 
the qualitative aspect of evaluation, namely trustworthiness (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
The notion of trustworthiness contains four core components which the researcher must 
consider in order to ensure a qualitative thesis; (A) Credibility, (B) Transferability, (C) 
Dependability and (D) Confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The main implications of these 
components are evaluated and discussed below. 
 
The notion of credibility concerns the degree of truthfulness of the findings. To ensure the thesis 
truthfulness we chose to contrast our empirical findings in several stages. Therefore, 
comparisons with previous research as well as between the cases themselves have been carried 
out in order to ensure consistency and minimize the risk of overlooking essentials. According 
to Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008), a combination of comparisons to both previous studies as 
well as between the cases themselves is advocated as a mean of ensuring truthfulness, which 
strengthens the credibility. However, we must also recognize the fact that a study’s credibility 
is rarely complete, thus it would be naïve to argue that our thesis is a complete reflection of 
truth. Despite this, credibility should be deemed significant due to the active comparisons and 
the number of cases examined, as advocated by Yin (2007). In the case of transferability, the 
findings general applicability to other contexts, we established a clear purpose which was aimed 
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at supplementing the current body of research as well as contributing to entrepreneurs- and 
funds to ability to negate risk, which directly seeks to increase the applicability of the findings 
presented by the thesis. Furthermore, we have strived to increase transferability by discussing 
findings and ideas presented in direct relation to each chapter, which also enables the reader to 
draw or apply partial results from the thesis. Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) advocates partial 
conclusions as a mean of making the findings more accessible to the target audience. Therefore, 
we consider the transferability to be significant, especially for the thesis target audience. 
 
The third component, dependability, concerns the repeatability of the study. In this regard the 
main issue lies in replicating the empirical base. We understand the severe difficulties in 
replicating qualitative data mainly due to Jacobsen’s (2002) claims regarding respondents’ 
inability to reproduce their wording in the exact same way. This issue was considered in 
developing the questionnaire, keeping the scope of the questions narrow while maintaining the 
respondents’ ability to speak freely. According to Wallén (1996), one will most likely be able 
to achieve results with acceptable similarities if this type of questions were used. Hence, 
dependability must be considered more than sufficient of what is demanded from qualitative 
studies. Lastly, confirmability is the reduction of bias and the accuracy of the study. An 
important realization in this regard is that the width of the data collected were partly limited to 
the extent of the questions asked. However, respondents were allowed to elaborate freely on all 
the aspects related to the topic, which would have served to somewhat prevent this issue 
according to Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008). Despite this, we realize that premade questions 
may restrict the answers to some degree. Therefore, respondents have also been offered the 
opportunity to reread and comment the interview base resulting from the qualitative interviews, 
which would increase our chances of getting accurate data (Yin, 2007). Furthermore, when 
using a qualitative methodology, the data might become afflicted by bias which gives rise to 
differing statements (Yin, 2007). We have strived to decrease this bias by presenting the 
questions in a neutral manner and by not revealing the purpose of the study to the respondent, 
actions which serve to reduce bias according to Wallen (1996). However, we argue that bias is 
quite difficult to remove entirely, therefore, we have taken it into account when segmenting the 
data as well as in conducting our analysis. (Yin, 2007) holds this to be the preferred way of 
reducing bias. Hence, the method of collecting data, both regarding bias and accuracy, should 
be considered sufficient. Concluding the methodological trustworthiness, we argue that several 
aspects must be considered but also that they have been mitigated to a large extent. Therefore, 
the methodological- and overall trustworthiness must be considered high.  
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4. Empirical Findings 
This chapter aims to acquaint the reader with the case study’s respondents and present the empirical 
base derived from the interviews and data collected. Initially, the pre-study is presented followed by an 
account of the respondents. Hereafter, a detailed presentation of the data obtained from interviews with 
venture capital funds’ analysts follows. 
4.1 Pre-Study 
The pre-study was conducted in order to narrow the scope of the study and enable us to pinpoint 
the theoretical base. It was carried out by interviewing managers of venture capital funds, asking 
them about their experiences regarding contractual- and risk-implications. Based on the pre-
study, eight primary arguments were developed, regarding contractual and risk-impacting 
problems.3 These also served as keystones in our interview process and will be used as headlines 
for the empirical base. Hence, the empirical data derived (presented in chapter 4.3-4) is 
structured in accordance with these arguments, which are presented below.4 
4.1.1 Perceived Contractual Implications 
A majority of the managers from the private venture capital sector held a lack of information as 
the primary problem area when creating contractual agreements with target-firms. This problem 
was claimed to be present to a larger extent in the case of innovative start-ups due to that the 
situational- and target-firm specifics are held to be more complex. Five out of six 
representatives also mentioned extensive costs when establishing a relationship with the target 
firm as driving reluctance. Lastly, a more implicit factor, risk of deception, was addressed by 
four respondents. They argued that firm-managers might know more about their company than 
the fund does. This isn’t considered acceptable from the funds perspective since investors are 
keen on having the information advantage, partly due to the risk of being misled into 
unfavorable investments. 
4.1.2 Perceived Factors Impacting Risk 
When assessing risk in relation to the yield assessment equation presented in the introduction 
(Chapter 1.1.1), five post-investment problems were held by the private venture funds to be the 
reasons for investment reluctance. First and foremost, representatives from the capital funds 
argued that entrepreneurs, inexperienced in fund-management, would act careless when using 
the resources provided by the fund. Hence, investments would not provide the impact to firm 
viability that was initially estimated. Several representatives also doubted the entrepreneur’s 
                                                          
3 A summary of the arguments addressed may be found in appendix (Annex 4) 
4 A list of the pre-study respondents, the pre-study process and questionnaire may be found in Annex 3 and 2. 
Wågerman & Danielsson 2014 
20 
competency as to manage a growing company as well as the manager’s commitment to the 
project. These, among other factors, was claimed to sometimes also result in disagreements 
regarding e.g. objectives which may impair the investment. Lastly, funds understanding of the 
target firms product or concept was addressed as the most pressing risk. This is due to the 
innovative nature of these firms which often means exploring new areas of business and 
science, preventing general estimations to a large extent. 
4.2 Cases and Respondents 
During the spring of 2014, a number of interviews were carried out with analysts of venture 
capital funds, addressing their experiences regarding start-up investments undertaken from 
2010 to 2013. The interviewees are all analysts on private funds operating partly within the 
innovative segment in Sweden. A summary of the interview-objects are presented below. 
Exhibit 4.1 – List of Respondents - Private Venture Capital Funds. 
 
The cases span over eight different private venture capital funds and a total of 22 analysts.5 
Despite the differing turnovers, the firms are all in the same phase of development, namely the 
“start-up” phase. Please note that the cases have been anonymized due to capital fund requests. 
                                                          
5 A complete table and a brief summary of the funds listed may be found in the appendix (Annex 1 and 5) 
Case Industry Turnover prior investment Venture fund
1 IT 0 Via ventures
2 IT 3 Via ventures
3 IT 2 Via ventures
4 Industry 27 CapMan
5 IT 0 Coeli
6 IT 1 SEB Venture Captial
7 IT 14 SEB Venture Captial
8 IT 0 SEB Venture Captial
9 Industry 22 EQT
10 Bio-tech 7 EQT
11 IT 4 Sting
12 IT 0,5 Sting
13 Med-tech 0 Sting
14 IT 12 Sting
15 IT 9 Sting
16 IT 0 Winngefors Invest
17 IT 0 Winngefors Invest
18 IT 5 Winngefors Invest
19 IT 0 Winngefors Invest
20 Services 0,5 Nordic Capital
21 IT 15 Nordic Capital
22 Industry 7 Nordic Capital
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4.3 Experienced Contractual Implications 
Below follows an account of the respondents’ answers regarding the study’s questionnaire and 
the first four arguments derived from the pre-study, which are used as headlines, addressing 
contractual issues prior- and post investment. 
4.3.1 Expensive Undertaking 
Several cases showed that the process of creating contractual obligations may often be more 
costly than first perceived. The extensiveness of negotiations and may be quite difficult to 
predict. Therefore, analysts asserts that they often add a cost-margin in this regard. Despite this, 
respondents argue that extensive negotiations are not the main driver of high costs, this is due 
to the marginal cost of time and effort in the negotiation-phase being minor. A majority of the 
analysts claimed that costs derived from investigations of the target firm, often at early stages, 
were the most extensive ones in the recent undertakings. 
 
“The project I was entrusted with resulted in broken cost-estimates after merely a couple of 
weeks. Information is expensive.” 
-Analyst, Sting 
Some analysts held these issues to be a struggle of two general obligations. First, analysts were 
expected to keep the costs to a minimum due to the direct impact on the fund. However, they 
were also expected to minimize the risks involved by conducting a thorough examination of the 
target-firm. The latter would have a greater negative impact on the fund if realized. Hence, a 
majority of analysts argued that an extensive examination-process was of crucial importance, 
and it was therefore also allowed to be the main driver of costs. Due to the unpredictability of 
the investigation conducted on the target firm, costs had risen to double of initial estimations in 
several cases. According to the respondents, this also led them to reduce other costs such as; 
creating the actual contracts, costs associated with relations towards the entrepreneur and 
expenses resulting from pre-contractual negotiations and proceedings. 
4.3.2 Deceptive Counterpart 
None of the respondents claimed to have been deceived by target-firm entrepreneurs in the 
cases examined, nor had they felt as if the entrepreneurs were trying mislead them. They argued 
that most entrepreneurs were grateful for the help and cooperation and recognized the 
competence of the analysts and the venture capital fund. Despite this, several analysts felt as if 
they were in an information disadvantage in relation to their counterpart. The entrepreneur 
would possess a substantial amount of product and concept-specific knowledge of which the 
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fund could not procure without an extensive process of examination. An analyst expressed his 
experience with information disadvantages as follows. 
 
“Only fifteen minutes into our first session regarding investment-terms, I realized that I was 
unable to grasp what my counterpart proposed. I chose to terminate the session immediately.” 
-Analyst, Via Ventures 
Due to similar situations arising frequently, analysts argued that the best way to bridge this 
knowledge-gap was to be careful in creating contractual agreements. They would therefore 
often suggest broad paragraphs, which covered large portions of conceptual- or technological 
specifics. 
4.3.3 Insufficient Information 
According to the respondents, the lack of information when creating contractual agreements 
was always present in the cases. All of the analysts argued that additional information would 
have helped them to further understand all the aspects of the specific venture. Analysts claimed 
that this lack of information was particularly present in the case of the target-firms conceptual 
characteristics. e.g. not knowing whether the market potential of the concept estimated was to 
be considered correct, or if technological progress would decrease costs sufficiently to enable 
viable margins. Several analysts expressed this issue in similar terms. 
 
“Granted venture capital is about taking risks, but it will be your neck on the line if your venture 
fails. Therefore you should do everything in your power to hedge what you don’t know.” 
-Analyst, EQT 
Hence, they argued that the “information gap” caused them to include general paragraphs in the 
contracts due to the risk of overlooking certain general aspects of the specific agreement. A 
number of the respondents claimed that the lack of information was not necessarily a deal-
breaker and that it concerned details which only caused minor uncertainties. According to the 
analysts, a certain degree of uncertainty was to be expected from an investment of this kind, not 
giving rise to any distinct pre-contractual measures to be taken. Instead making them rely on a 
standardized process, which served to reduce risks by including a broad range of regulations. 
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4.4 Factors Impacting the Risk Variable 
Our empirical account of the factors impacting the risk variable is also segmented based on the 
arguments drawn from the pre-study. To derive the qualitative data presented below, evaluative 
data was collected beforehand and discussed with the analysts in parallel to the more general 
questions found in the questionnaire. Hence, part of the data is comprised of statements 
regarding analysts direct experiences mixed with the actual numerical and empirical outcome 
in the cases reviewed. 
4.4.1 Complexity of Target Firm Concept 
Even post-contracting, cases showed that the analysts did not always have the information that 
they required in order to fully assess or understand the venture. An explanatory factor was 
claimed to be the careful nature of entrepreneurs in start-up firms. But also the need to avoid 
transparency in order to avoid “theft-of-concept” in the initial phases of corporate development. 
Hence, analysts weren’t entirely sure to whether potential opportunities ran the risk of being 
overlooked by the entrepreneur. These uncertainty-factors also meant that the venture capital 
funds felt the need to safeguard its investment by demanding increased influence and detailed 
accounts on activities carried out. 
 
“After investing, I quickly realized that my business-partner wasn’t keen on sharing 
information. Therefore, I had to force him to provide me with the information that I considered 
necessary under the threat of divestment.” 
-Analyst, Via Ventures 
Furthermore, several cases showed that there is an industry-wide fear of being deceived by the 
target-firm. This is due to a few, well known examples of such deceptions in which 
entrepreneurs had lied about their product or concept viability, leaving the funds with stakes in 
companies of which were without value. The idea of possible deception also affected the cases 
examined, in which analysts took safety-measures post-investment. Conducting expensive 
ongoing screening processes regarding the firm’s viability or trying to diversify risk by agreeing 
to joint investments with other firms or public venture capital. 
4.4.2 Competency of the Entrepreneur 
Many analysts recognize the competence of the entrepreneur regarding his or her ability to 
manage the growing firm as an issue. They claim that many of the entrepreneurs governing 
these innovative start-ups come from a scientific background with little or no education in 
business. Hence, as the firms become larger, there might not be enough in-house competence 
in the target-firm. In all of the cases, entrepreneurs themselves wished to remain in senior 
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management when discussing this pre-investment. They also strongly argued that they 
possessed the necessary competence to run the operation despite a changing organizational 
structure. The cases showed that the funds themselves had been forced to change or add external 
competence to the target-firm, often by entering the firm themselves as board-members. In 
some cases however, funds had asked managers to step down from their positions. Both kinds 
of the interventions discussed also caused disagreements which ultimately led to stronger 
measures or in a few cases, a part-divestment. 
 
“The business-partner was very upset when we demanded a chair in the board. However, it 
was necessary to ensure that the firm met the target objective.” 
-Analyst, Sting 
4.4.3 Inability to Administer Funds Obtained 
Analysts argue that money invested in the target firm often has a predetermined purpose. In 
many cases, a discussion is held between the parties regarding the exact allocation of monetary 
means before the entrepreneur is allowed to allocate them. However, the data shows that funds 
are not always allocated in accordance with the agreed standards. Analysts recognize this fact 
and many argue that it would be too costly to pursue the entrepreneurs in this regard. The 
primary reasons put forth by the analysts concerns time, monetary expenses as well as putting 
pressure on the relationship between the entrepreneur and the fund. Therefore, analysts claimed 
that the indirect losses caused by disregarding the agreed strategy were less costly than actually 
confronting the target-firm in the cases discussed. 
 
“Naturally, an improvement of fund-allocation would result in a higher yield, but the potential 
loss from disputes is ten times as impactful on results.” 
-Analyst, SEB Venture Capital 
“I was advised by my executives to avoid disagreements due to fund allocation with the 
business-partner at all costs.” 
-Analyst, Nordic Capital 
In three cases, analysts were forced to address the issue resulting in a severely stressed 
relationship, with the fund only granting minimal sums and demanding a more thorough 
auditing process. There were also “developing-discussions” with the entrepreneur in order to 
motivate a better allocation of funds, in which the entrepreneur had to explain the allocation of 
funds before the venture capitalist would release them. 
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4.4.4 Disagreements regarding Firm Objective 
In about half the cases, respondents had been involved in disagreements regarding the 
objectives of the venture. In almost all the cases afflicted, analysts claimed that the 
disagreement concerned the long-term objectives of the firm. Whereas the entrepreneur often 
argued that the processes of launching products or limiting R&D should be allowed to take 
more time than the venture capital fund had estimated. Furthermore, some venture capital funds 
sought to sell their stake of the start-up when the firms’ growth rate started to decline and reach 
the next stages of firm development. 
 
“We have an exit-strategy in almost all of our ventures, this motivates us and the target firm to 
increase our efforts and achieve the yield-objective.” 
-Analyst, Sting 
However, many entrepreneurs strongly opposed the strategies of the venture capital funds due 
to the long-term firm consequences they would incur. In these instances, entrepreneurs were 
worried that a short-sighted strategy would damage their firm long term. 
4.4.5 Lacking Commitment 
A few cases revealed a lacking commitment on the entrepreneurs’ behalf. In this regard it 
concerned activities of which the entrepreneur might not possess the necessary competency to 
carry out, such as marketing or other activities related to product launch. Analysts were 
experiencing little or no assistance in their efforts to launch the product. In one case, the 
entrepreneur did not address questions relating to the launch-strategy presented by the board. 
However, the majority of cases examined showed no sign of issues regarding the entrepreneur’s 
dedication both pre- and post-investment. Instead it revealed that entrepreneurs’ efforts 
increased in most cases, as a result of shared competence and additional funds. 
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5. Analysis 
The analysis has been conducted in two parts, each one addressing a particular set of sub-questions. 
First, we identify and elaborate on the factors affecting contractual obligations (sub-q 1-2). The second 
part is aimed at revealing the second tier of implications (sub-q 3-4), those which arises from incomplete 
contracts. Lastly we discuss the potential linkages between them, addressing the main research question. 
5.1 Contractual Implications 
Using our theoretical framework, we aim to match our empirical base with more precise 
implications in order to create a foundation on which deeper analysis and comparisons may be 
conducted. This will be carried out by filtering the empirical base through a more scientifically 
developed structure, presented by Kaplan & Strömberg (2001). This structure is made up of 
three factors of which gives rise to incomplete contracts, transaction costs, bounded rationality 
and information asymmetries. They will be used to analyze the empirical accounts on expensive 
undertaking, insufficient information and deceptive counterpart respectively. In order to 
identify the specific implications and assess their magnitude, discussions summarizing the 
extent of implications present in the cases analyzed may be found at the end of each subchapter. 
5.1.1 Implications due to Transaction Costs 
A majority of cases examined reveals higher costs resulting from creating contractual 
agreements then first expected by the parties. Bajari & Tadelis (2001) claims that the primary 
reasons of costs in these stages are factors relating to information gathering and examination of 
the target firm. In several cases, costs had risen to over 200 % of initial estimations in these 
areas. Hence, the claims made by Bajari & Tadelis (2001) are justified which means that the 
due diligence process and its underlying unpredictability is the direct cause of the costs being 
higher than estimated. Furthermore, several of the analysts recognizes that the increased costs 
in the process of due diligence led to reduced expenses in other regards, such as creating the 
actual contractual obligation. The reduction of costs was necessary in order to meet the 
overhead cost-objective of the venture. Fama (1980) suggests that an uneven distribution of 
monetary means often results in overlooking details and using bench-marks to compensate for 
unevenly distributed costs. Costs allocated to contractual creation was particularly small in 
several cases. Therefore, we maintain that standardized contractual agreements are used more 
extensively because it is the cheaper alternative in contrast to creating the contracts from 
scratch. Lowry (1976) claims that costs related to negotiations are often the most extensive 
when creating contractual agreements. The data derived from the cases examined does not 
support this as there are no accounts of extensive costs in this regard. Instead, analysts use a 
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standardized form of bargaining, aligned with the thesis presented by Argyres & Liebeskinds 
(1999). Hence, we argue that costs of negotiations are minor due to a standardized process, 
instead unevenly distributed costs are more troublesome as they are causing standardization. 
5.1.2 Implications due to Bounded Rationality 
Despite perceived varying degrees of complexity, analysts did not have all the information that 
they desired in order to fully understand the investment, causing them to take contractual 
precautions. According to Radner (1996), this phenomenon may result in a simplification of 
reality, causing parties to disregard important paragraphs. However, the measures taken were 
not aimed directly at reducing the complexity of the target-firm specifics but rather at reducing 
the analysts own risk of failure. As revealed by the cases examined, a standardized process (or 
“bench-marked-process”) was used frequently when encountering information shortages. 
Radner (1996) proposes that this generality of contracting will result in incomplete contracts. 
We argue that the latter notion offers substantially more explanatory value to the bounded-
rationality issue than the individual simplification of reality. The generality of the means used 
may result in contracts with regulations which aren’t applicable to the specific case. Hence, 
they become too simplistic to handle the problems which the parties face post-investment. 
5.1.3 Implications due to Information Asymmetries 
In the cases examined, the analysts had no or very little experience of entrepreneurs purposely 
misleading them when creating contractual agreements. This contradicts the claims made by 
Chiappori & Salanié (2000), which argues that deception is likely to complicate contracts. In 
spite of their claims, we argue that deception is a minor issue, mainly due to the target-firms 
dependency of the means granted by venture capital funds. However, a majority of analysts 
thought that entrepreneurs might have a large indirect advantage from their specific firm- and 
industry knowledge. Hence, representatives of the venture capital funds would act cautiously 
when contractual agreements were created. Trester’s (1998) thesis agrees with this cautions 
approach, claiming that funds must be careful or be left with unfavorable terms. We consider 
this to be a significant problem, which also prevents precise paragraphs to be included in the 
contract. This is due to that precise paragraphing would negate any room for interpretation, 
leaving the better informed party with a significant advantage. In addition to this, cases showed 
that the adopted approach also led to an increase in pre-contractual costs such as due diligence 
and industry-analysis. This contradicts the idea presented by Sharpe (1990), claiming that the 
lesser-informed part will inevitably agree to unfavorable terms. In contrast to Sharpe’s (1990) 
thesis, the additional investigations suggests efforts to reduce the information asymmetries 
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rather than to surrender to them. Therefore, information asymmetries must be considered 
problematic, mainly because it promotes general paragraphs and increases costs of examination. 
5.1.4 The Presence of Incomplete Contracts 
The presence of contractual implications analyzed are summarized in table 5.1 below. The table 
displays to which extent the contracts of the cases were affected by implications originating 
from transaction costs (TC), bounded rationality (BR) or information asymmetries (IA). In 
which the gray sections indicate a presence of contractual issues. Out 22 contracts created with 
target-firms, one could be considered to be completely free from the implications examined. 
Leaving the vast majority of cases affected by contractual implications. This suggests that the 
venture capital industry may suffer from contractual difficulties in its relation with innovative 
start-up firms. As derived from the prior analysis, the primary factors driving these implications 
are the ones arising from high costs and information gaps linked to a lack of information. The 
latter also causing unnecessary or general paragraphs to be included in the agreement, 
paragraphs of which later may serve no purpose or even cause damage. 
Exhibit 5.1 Presence of Contractual Implications in Cases Examined 
 
All of the issues raised also encourages the use of general paragraphs or standardized contracts 
between parties, which appears to be the primary implications. Kaplan & Strömberg (2001) 
Case Industry Turnover prior investment Venture fund TC BR IA
1 IT 0 Via ventures    
2 IT 3 Via ventures  
3 IT 2 Via ventures   
4 Industry 27 CapMan    
5 IT 0 Coeli   
6 IT 1 SEB Venture Captial   
7 IT 14 SEB Venture Captial   
8 IT 0 SEB Venture Captial   
9 Industry 22 EQT   
10 Bio-tech 7 EQT   
11 IT 4 Sting    
12 IT 0,5 Sting
13 Med-tech 0 Sting   
14 IT 12 Sting  
15 IT 9 Sting  
16 IT 0 Winngefors Invest    
17 IT 0 Winngefors Invest  
18 IT 5 Winngefors Invest   
19 IT 0 Winngefors Invest   
20 Services 0,5 Nordic Capital   
21 IT 15 Nordic Capital   
22 Industry 7 Nordic Capital   
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suggest that standardization of contracts is the fundamental cause of the majority of the 
implications happening post-investment. Therefore, we argue that the presence of such 
contractual complications presented above may also prove unable in preventing risk-increasing 
factors that may arise in the later stages of the business relationship. 
5.2 Factors Increasing Direct Risk 
The second subset of research questions aims to derive the primary implications of which are 
affecting the venture capital funds direct risk. The principal-agent theory presents a framework 
for analyzing conflicts and problems, which translates into risk, in the venture capitalist-
entrepreneur relationship. Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest considering adverse selection, 
moral hazard, conflicts of interest and the hold-up phenomenon. In accordance with the 
previous section, the analysis will be summarized and discussed at the end of the subchapter. 
5.2.1 Adverse Selection 
Several cases reveal that information disadvantages are a major concern, mainly because small 
firms are not obliged to be transparent by law as they are not listed on the stock-exchange. 
Cumming (2006) claims that a lack transparency will also result in a secretive approach against 
all external parties, including investors. We argue that Cumming’s thesis is accurate in the sense 
that target-firms seems reluctant to share any information, however, it does not merely seem to 
be a problem of transparency. Many analysts argue that target-firms also have strong 
incitements not to reveal anything due to the main assets often being knowledge and pending 
patents. Akerlof (1970) proposes that high accumulation of intangible resources will prevent 
target-firms from sharing information with external parties. We agree with this notion rather 
than the one presented by Cumming (2006), the firms are all very high-tech which makes 
knowledge a key resource, therefore, sharing it could prove fatal. According to Levin (2001), 
the secretive approach indirectly translates into a fear of being deceived which causes the 
investors to act cautious when interacting with target-firms. Analysts maintain that well-known 
examples of deception, resulting from the funds tolerance of the target-firms secrecy, causes an 
industry-wide fear of deception. Therefore, we argue that Levin’s (2001) claims are justified, 
as the fear does translate directly into the adverse selection phenomenon. Hence, this aspect of 
the adverse selection-phenomenon causes analysts to act carefully as well as adopting a more 
hostile attitude, demanding rather than asking for information, causing strains on the investor-
entrepreneur relationship. According to Cumming (2006), the previously discussed issue also 
contributes to the extensive ongoing examining process and potentially that investors venture 
into partnerships without proper backing, being misled by the entrepreneur regarding firm 
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characteristics. Analysts claim that they sometimes underestimate the managerial competence 
of the target-firm, causing them to replace board members with severe consequences. However, 
we argue that this is due to the entrepreneurs own inability to realize that managerial 
competence is lacking rather than trying to hide this fact from the investors. Therefore, the issue 
of adverse selection is present mainly due to the target-firms unwillingness to share core 
intelligence, which causes funds to adopt a more hostile approach. 
5.2.2 Moral Hazard 
Numerical data derived from the funds shows that there has been several shifts in allocation of 
monetary means post-investment (Exhibit 5.1). Expenditures such as; consulting costs, travel, 
depreciation and other expenses has increased with double digits. Meanwhile, R&D and 
CAPEX has severely reduced. Mirrlees (1999) claims that the reallocation is a direct 
consequence of more risk-affine behavior on the entrepreneur’s behalf, caused by risk-
diversification. We consider Mirrlees (1999) statement to be valid, the decrease in R&D and 
increases in deprecation should be considered quite normal due to the venture capital fund 
pressing the start-up closer to the commercialization phase. However, the remaining ones might 
cause problems for the venture capital fund in the form of a flat monetary loss. These allocations 
are not driven by profit-maximization and are rather illogical, which supports Mirrlees thesis. 
Exhibit 5.2 Expenses in Target Firms Pre- and Post Investment6 
 
Source – produced by authors and based on figures derived from case-outcomes. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) proposes that this issue arises from the inability to fully monitor the 
target-firm and not the inability to detect the faulty allocation of money itself. Most analysts 
                                                          
6 Please note that these figures are scrambled due to firm confidentiality. Hence, this is an average of all the 
cases examined. 
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claim that they are aware of these changes in expenditure. However, they argue that pursuing 
the entrepreneur would be far too costly and risk putting a personal strain on the relationship 
between the parties. This notion supports Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) thesis, therefore, we 
argue that this is a highly complex issue of which must be dealt with pre-investment. The 
alternative is either a monetary loss or a severe strain on the relationship between the parties. 
5.2.3 Conflicts of Interest 
According to the analysts, implications due to uncertainty regarding how to interpret the 
contracts, or general disagreements resulting from firm objective are common. Eisenhart (1989) 
suggest this to be a result of increased investor-influence over the target-firm. We consider her 
statement to be valid as cases further shows that independent entrepreneurs often become upset 
as a result of having to consult the fund before making firm specific decisions. Furthermore, 
analysts claim that entrepreneurs often have a close attachment to their firm, causing them to 
sometimes offset the yield objective of the venture capital fund, due to that this objective might 
conflict with their own goals or ambitions. Eisenhart (1989) argues that this is a matter of 
perspectives, whereas the investor operates with more short-term yield objectives. We argue 
that the different time-horizons offers immense explanatory value, as they forces two very 
different types of objectives on the target-firm, namely both short- and long term profitability. 
However, the notion presented by Kaplan & Strömberg (2001), suggesting that personal 
features impact the presence of conflicts, is not supported by the claims made by the analysts. 
We argue that these conflicts actually exists but that they may be perceived by analysts as 
conflicts based on objectives rather than personal due to that e.g. extrovert personalities might 
express their discontent regarding objectives and other topics in a more extensive manner. 
According to Eisenhart (1989), disagreements may halt the core activities of the firm, such as 
decisions in pressing matters, resulting in severe losses on both parties’ behalf. The accounts 
presented by analysts partly supports this notion, claiming that entrepreneurs would oppose the 
decisions, affecting profitability. Hence, we consider conflicts of interest to be impactful 
regarding not only direct losses of production but also the venture funds overall yield objective. 
5.2.4 Hold-up Phenomena 
Goldberg (1976) claims that the relationship between the investor and target-firm is particularly 
afflicted by the hold-up phenomena. However, analysts argue that there are very few issues 
relating to entrepreneurial commitment or general hold-up of the business. We argue that this 
is due to the agreed overhead objective as well as the funds pre-determined capital injections, 
which cause sunk costs to only occur on the venture capital funds behalf. Therefore, the parties 
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have prevented this issue by pre-investment agreements. Bolton & Dewatripont’s (2005) thesis, 
claiming that regarding the viability of contracts in preventing the hold-up phenomena further 
strengthens our argument. However, in the few cases afflicted by the phenomena, analysts had 
experienced that the uncommitted entrepreneur’s actions affected the performance of the firm 
and the cooperation with the fund to a great extent. Hence, the hold-up issue is to be considered 
highly impactful but quite rare. 
5.2.5 The Presence of Factors Affecting Risk 
Exhibit 5.3, summarizes the presence of factors affecting the venture capital funds direct risk, 
whereas dark sections represent a presence of risk-elevating implications. All of the factors 
discussed above were shown to affect the performance of the firms and therefore also the direct 
risk carried by the funds. However, the hold-up phenomena was only evident in five cases and 
therefore considered to be a minor implication in relation to the other factors. 
Exhibit 5.3 Presence of Risk-Enhancing Factors in Cases Examined 
 
Moral hazard as well as adverse selection are highly impactful regarding the venture capital 
funds direct risk exposure. These factors proved to have a significant impact on the funds ability 
to predict outcomes, strains and conflicts resulting from hostile attitudes and disagreements 
between parties. Furthermore, flat loss of monetary funds were evident in the case of 
entrepreneur fund allocation, increasing expenses of which was deemed as unnecessary. 
Case Industry Turnover prior investment Venture fund Adverse Moral Conflicts Hold-up
1 IT 0 Via ventures    
2 IT 3 Via ventures  
3 IT 2 Via ventures     
4 Industry 27 CapMan     
5 IT 0 Coeli   
6 IT 1 SEB Venture Captial    
7 IT 14 SEB Venture Captial   
8 IT 0 SEB Venture Captial    
9 Industry 22 EQT    
10 Bio-tech 7 EQT    
11 IT 4 Sting    
12 IT 0,5 Sting
13 Med-tech 0 Sting    
14 IT 12 Sting   
15 IT 9 Sting   
16 IT 0 Winngefors Invest     
17 IT 0 Winngefors Invest  
18 IT 5 Winngefors Invest    
19 IT 0 Winngefors Invest    
20 Services 0,5 Nordic Capital    
21 IT 15 Nordic Capital    
22 Industry 7 Nordic Capital    
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Conflicts of interest also prevented core business activities and damaged the short-term 
production as well as the overhead yield objective. These three implications are therefore to be 
considered as the primary drivers of investment-related risk. 
5.3 Coherency of Implications 
In order to address the research question at hand, we must determine whether there is a 
coherency between incomplete contracts and risks. Hence, this part of the analysis aims to tie 
the two segment-parts (research-q subset 1-2 and 3-4) together in order to discuss and evaluate 
possible linkages between incomplete contracts and direct risks. 
5.3.1 Factor-Coherence Analysis 
The analysis has revealed that the cases are afflicted by numerous risk-increasing implications. 
In addition, it also showed that these implications caused contractual issues which led to a more 
extensive use of templates and standardized paragraphs and difficulties to interpret all the 
aspects of the agreement. Hence, this study shows that contractual implications have a 
substantial impact and presence, giving rise to incomplete contracts. Examining the tables 
presented above (summarized in Exhibit 5.4) reveals that cases afflicted by contractual 
implications also suffers from an increase in factors related to direct risk. 
Exhibit 5.4 Coherence between Contractual Implications and Direct Risks 
 
Case TC BR IA Adverse Moral Conflicts Hold-up
1       
2   
3       
4        
5     
6      
7     
8      
9      
10      
11       
12
13      
14    
15    
16        
17   
18      
19      
20      
21      
22      
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The cases afflicted by all of the possible contractual implications also have the highest degree 
of post-investment risk-factors present. Consistently, cases with all three pre-contractual 
implications present amounts to three, or in some cases four post-investment risk-factors. In 
addition to this, the cases which only has a minor presence of contractual implications have a 
lesser post-investment risk, amounting to zero or one risk-factor. The total deviations are at the 
most one factor, which should be considered as normal due to external influences and the 
presence of chance. Therefore, this study shows that a more extensive amount of contractual 
implications can be said to indirectly cause a more extensive amount of problems affecting 
direct risks. Hence, coherence between the factors examined should be considered significant. 
5.4 Academic Review 
In order to assess the general plausibility of the results derived before drawing any conclusions, 
it is beneficial to first discuss and compare the findings of the study with those of the faculty 
and previous research (Jacobsen, 2002). The primary reasons for this discussion is to broaden 
our understanding of the study’s results, enabling us to properly address the findings of the 
study before actually claiming a particular conclusion. 
5.4.1 Faculty Member Discussion 
After conducting our analysis, we presented the results derived to Björn Sandén (interviewed 
15 May 2014), assistant professor at Chalmers University of Technology. He has conducted 
research on innovative firms niched towards environmental technology and has a broad 
understanding of these firms complexity. He acknowledges the results presented by our thesis 
and further suggests that the firms, with a high degree of technical know-how, often suffers 
from the need to simplify their business enough in order for stakeholders to understand all the 
aspects of the business. Therefore, the practice of standardized or template tools are commonly 
used. This is a thought worth highlighting, due to our narrow scope of target-firms, the results 
may be less applicable to the general firm. Sandén emphasizes the firms’ inability to address 
the factors which are underlining the direct risks but does not believe the firms themselves to 
be idle in this regard. He argues that both actors must be aware of the issue of incomplete 
contracting, however, they might not realize to what extent it affects the risks. Due to the spread 
in different drivers of risks (shown in exhibit 5.3), it might be hard to directly address which 
risks must be negated in each specific case. Hence, prevention of pre-investment might be much 
more difficult in practice then theory suggests. Sandén supports this logic, claiming that the 
unpredictability of the specific prevention-costs in time and money might cause the parties to 
disregard them altogether. Therefore, one must recognize that the results derived from our thesis 
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are not directly applicable to the firms’ strategy but rather to act as explanatories to what areas 
are worth examining pre-investment. However, the notion of coherence as such is not disputed 
by Sandén. 
5.4.2 Previous Studies Comparison 
Despite Sandén’s acknowledgements of the results derived from our study, they do not stand 
uncontested. Previous research conducted by Triantis (2001) suggests that the effect on direct 
risk is minor in the case of contractual implications. And further that the parties are more than 
capable of managing these implications. The results in our study do not contradict the latter but 
rather suggests that they are not practicing their ability to the extent necessary. Furthermore, 
we suspect that the case of a weaker coherence, suggested by Triantis (2001), is due to the fact 
of differing firms of interest. Whereas our study concerns innovative start-ups, while his study 
concerns larger firms, which also explains the increase in coherence between the risks and 
contractual implications shown in our thesis. Yet, the deviations between the findings of the 
studies conducted should not be disregarded. In addition, our study’s results regarding 
coherence is supported by a majority of the previous research conducted. As proposed, but not 
proven, by Jeng & Wells (2000), there is a connection between direct risks and contractual pre-
investment implications, mainly due to the use of templates and standardized contractual 
agreements, which is aligned with our findings. Furthermore, our studies results regarding the 
core direct risks are also supported to some extent, whereas Hellman & Puri’s (2000) thesis 
indicates that disagreements and insufficient information are common drivers. However, none 
of the previous research confirms our findings regarding moral hazard or any hold-up 
phenomena-presence, which would suggest that our findings in these regards should be deemed 
more uncertain. Contradicting this is that most of the previous researchers differing focus, 
whereas no start-up firms with similar characteristics were incorporated in the previous studies, 
with the exception of Strömsten & Waluszewskis (2012) thesis regarding bio-tech companies. 
However, their thesis did not incorporate the numerical aspects, which would explain the lack 
of moral hazard. 
 
Hence, our study further strengthens the most recognized belief in previous research, that there 
is a coherence between contracts and risks. In addition, it also suggests an additional dimension 
to previous research, regarding the range of risks evident in the case of innovative start-ups, 
namely moral hazard and the hold-up phenomena. 
  
Wågerman & Danielsson 2014 
36 
6. Conclusions 
In this section the introduction is revisited and conclusions addressing the initially posed questions 
are drawn from the results and analysis presented in chapter five. In addition, the results are 
discussed, criticized and suggestions regarding further research are presented. 
6.1 Concluding the Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to provide managers of start-up firms and venture capital funds with 
empirical support, primarily addressing direct investment-risk and its underlying causes. 
Increasing their understanding of the impact of contractual implications post-investment, as 
well as providing support regarding prevention of investment-related risks. In order to address 
these undertakings, the research questions will be revisited and answered in a concise manner, 
followed by a discussion regarding managerial applications. 
1) Which factors affect the quality of the contractual obligations with innovative start-ups? 
The principal factors which affects contractual obligations are; costs associated with target-firm 
examination which causes uneven allocation of costs and standardized contracts (transaction 
costs), information disadvantages resulting in simplistic regulations (bounded rationality) as 
well as asymmetries regarding firm-specific knowledge causing general contractual paragraphs 
(information asymmetries). 
2) To what extent are these factors causing issues in the contracts created by venture capital 
funds? 
The presence of the factors were extensive and resulted in incomplete contracts in a majority 
of cases examined. The factors were manifested in two main issues which complicated the 
content of contracts. First, they may give rise to unnecessary paragraphs, causing disagreements 
between parties. Second, the factors may also result in general standardization of contracts, 
which decreases their overall viability. 
3) Which implications may originate from a lack of contractual prevention? 
The implications caused by these incomplete contracts are primarily related to information 
advantages which strains the relationship (adverse selection), entrepreneurial disobedience 
resulting in flat monetary loss (moral hazard) and conflicting wills affecting overall profitability 
(conflicts of interest). Implications regarding lacking entrepreneurial commitment was also 
present but only to a lesser extent (hold-up phenomena). 
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4) How impactful are these implications in relation to the direct risks of the venture capital 
funds? 
Due to the significant connection found between issued caused by incomplete contracts and 
direct risk carried by the funds, the implications had a strong impact on the direct risk. As 
adverse selection and moral hazard were present in most cases and conflicts of interest in 
roughly half the cases, resulting in an overall lower yield on the venture capital funds behalf. 
Main Research Question and Final Conclusion 
To what extent do the implications of creating contractual agreements with entrepreneurs 
affect the direct risk of the venture capital funds? 
Based on the strong linkages amongst the presence of implications and risks analyzed, the study 
concludes that there is a significant coherence between the implications present when creating 
contracts and the direct risk experienced by the funds post-investment. 
6.1.1 Managerial Recommendation and Discussion 
Based on the conclusion of this study, venture capital funds might be able to prevent direct risks 
by addressing its underlying causes in contrast to focusing on the risks themselves. Hence, in 
addressing the target audience, we strongly advise managers of the funds as well as 
entrepreneurs to focus their efforts on the core of the problem, namely the factors causing 
incomplete contracts. A successful mitigation of these factors will severely reduce the post-
investment risk, in turn making the start-ups more attractive and increasing the yields of venture 
capital funds. Furthermore, the potential gain might be translatable into other industries and 
relationships, in which contractual agreements are a potential for risk-prevention. However, one 
must also be aware of the boundaries of the conclusions general applicability. As revealed by 
the discussion in the academic review, there were some delimitations present in the study. These 
delimitations indicates that addressing specific contractual- and risk driving implications are 
more difficult than first perceived. We argue that the conclusions presented by our study do not 
apply directly to other industries based on the contradictory results that previous studies have 
yielded in looking upon other sectors. In addition to this, one must consider the individual 
impact of the implications examined, due to our thesis focus on coherence and magnitude, the 
specific impact of individual factors and implications (derived from sub-research questions 1 
and 3) has not been covered. Therefore, we cannot give specific recommendations regarding 
which entities to disregard and which to focus on but rather to take them all into account when 
seeking to mitigate post-investment risk. 
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In the sub-questions examined, issues were present to a larger extent than we first expected 
based on previous research. We argue that this is due to the complex nature of the specific firms 
examined. Although it may also suggest that there is actually a severe profitability-reduction in 
the venture capital funds overall investments, which would be catastrophic from a managerial 
standpoint. Relating to this, examining whether the coherence is applicable to other business-
relationships, involving a similar degree of intimacy between the parties, such as start-up and 
supplier relationships would be very interesting. In these instances the direct risks would surely 
differ. However, the coherency between the contractual implications and direct risks of the 
entrepreneur and supplier might be even more significant. The potential gain of these parties 
are substantial, provided that they also experience an extensive coherency in the previously 
mentioned regard. Therefore, we strongly advocate further exploration of this uncharted field, 
as it may substantially increase managers understanding of how to their company may operate 
more efficiently. 
 
6.2 Suggestions Regarding Further Research 
As discussed previously, this study is subjected to a number of delimitations which must be 
addressed in order to provide the reader with an accurate understanding of the studies 
contribution to the academic and practical field of management theory. We consider these 
delimitations to be the most intriguing subjects to research further. Primarily, questioning the 
notion of coherence presented in this study by carrying out similar studies will fill important 
gaps regarding the extent of coherence between contractual implications and risk but also its 
presence in other industries. In addition to this, addressing differing relationships than the one 
examined by this study may offer even more explanatory value within the specific industry-
boundaries. Secondly, this study pays little attention to the extent of the specific implications 
examined. Therefore, a major issue in e.g. transaction costs may cause more substantial 
problems regarding direct risk than a presence of the other two contractual implications 
combined. To broaden the study to include a more complete analysis regarding the specific 
impact of each implication would be beneficial due to a potentially huge improvement in 
accuracy and effect when addressing specific contractual implications. Lastly, to address the 
more practical potential of an extended thesis. We argue that examination of the funds ability 
to actually discover and prevent the contractual implications pre-investment will add a valuable 
dimension to this field of research. Therefore, further research aiming to explain the practical 
potential of the coherence presented is strongly advised. 
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Annex 1 
 
List of case study respondents date and type of interview 
 
* Please note that Compl. Correspond stands for complementary correspondence. 
  
Case Industry Turnover prior investment Venture fund Date of interview Type of interview Compl. Correspond
1 IT 0 Via ventures 07-apr Personal Email
2 IT 3 Via ventures 07-apr Personal -
3 IT 2 Via ventures 08-apr Skype/mobile -
4 Industry 35 CapMan 16-apr Skype/mobile Email/Skype/mobile
5 IT 0 Coeli 17-apr Personal -
6 IT 1 SEB Venture Captial 18-apr Skype/mobile Email
7 IT 14 SEB Venture Captial 20-apr Email -
8 Med-tech 0 SEB Venture Captial 22-apr Skype/mobile Email
9 Industry 22 EQT 14-apr Personal Email
10 Bio-tech 7 EQT 14-apr Personal -
11 IT 4 Sting 21-apr Skype/mobile Email/Skype/mobile
12 IT 0,5 Sting 21-apr Skype/mobile -
13 Med-tech 0 Sting 21-apr Skype/mobile -
14 IT 12 Sting 22-apr Skype/mobile -
15 IT 9 Sting 25-apr Email Email
16 IT 0 Winngefors Invest 22-apr Skype/mobile Email
17 IT 0 Winngefors Invest 22-apr Skype/mobile Email
18 IT 5 Winngefors Invest 22-apr Skype/mobile -
19 IT 0 Winngefors Invest 26-apr Email Skype/mobile
20 Services 0,5 Nordic Capital 28-apr Personal Email
21 IT 15 Nordic Capital 28-apr Personal Email
22 Industry 7 Nordic Capital 28-apr Personal -
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Annex 2 
Questionnaire 
Section 1 – Contractual implications 
- How do you usually go about decreasing the investment-related risks before the 
investment is made? 
- Can you describe the contractual process? 
o What measures do you take before contracting? (Please exemplify) 
o How is the process of negotiation conducted, how do you ensure that you get 
the deal you want? (Please exemplify) 
o Based upon your experience related to this case, what are the main problems 
associated with erecting contractual agreements? 
 How does these manifest themselves? (Please exemplify) 
- Which are the primary factors to consider when writing contractual agreements with 
the target-firm? 
o Did you consider these in the case concerned? 
o (SUPPLEMENT) Have you encountered any of the following issues; lack of 
information, time shortages, venture expenditures to high or deception? (Please 
elaborate on any points of which you have encountered, exemplify) 
Section 2 – Risk-related implications 
- Have you experienced any problems post-investment in the case concerned? 
o If so, which? (Please exemplify) 
- Can you please elaborate on the number of which you sent us before this interview, 
why have the cost-structure changed/not changed in this case? 
o (SUPPLEMENT) Have you experienced any of the following problems post-
investment: Inability to administer funds, lacking competency, entrepreneurial 
commitment faltering, objective-disagreements or problems with 
understanding all the aspects of the target-firm? (Please elaborate on any points 
of which you have encountered, exemplify). 
Section 3 – Coherency 
- Do you believe that any actions taken in the pre-investment process might change the 
number of problems experienced post-investment? (If any problems were present). 
o If so, in what way? (Please exemplify)   
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Annex 3 
 
List of pre-study respondents date and type of interview 
 
 
Brief account regarding the pre-study process 
The pre-study was conducted on open discussion with managers of private venture capital 
funds. They were encouraged to elaborate on their view of contractual- and risk implication 
without being guided by precise questions. The discussions were started by the initial 
question: 
 
- Please tell us about your experiences and thoughts regarding contractual problems and 
the risks which you encounter when investing in innovative start-ups. 
 
Based on the accounts addressing this question, and more casual following questions, we were 
able to derive the most significant implications (arguments) by screening the emphasis and the 
number of managers addressing a particular issue. We then discussed these arguments and 
their individual explanatory value as well as feasibility in the context of our study. Based on 
these discussions, we were able to match the arguments with suitable theory and develop a 
questionnaire which was used to address the analysts in the case study. 
  
Name Venture fund Position Date Type of interview
Bengtsson, Jan ALMI Invest CEO 02-apr Skype/mobile
Johan Bygge EQT COO 03-apr Skype/mobile
Rydlinger, Bo Sofama AB CEO 25-mar Personal
Hemsöezinck, John Via venture CEO 07-apr Personal
Sundqvist, Jan Coeli CEO 03-apr Skype/mobile
Talborn, Henrik SVCA Cheif Ec 08-apr Skype/mobile
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Annex 4 
 
Arguments derived from the pre-study. 
Below follows a general account regarding the factors and implications derived from the pre-
study. 
Experienced contractual implications 
Contractual process is expensive 
Risk of deception by counterpart 
Insufficient information to erect satisfying contractual agreement 
Factors impacting the risk variable 
Agent’s potential carelessness when using acquired funds. 
Competency of the companies CEO/board as to manage the company long term. 
Agent’s (un)willingness to make a full commitment. 
Venture capital funds inability to understand the product/company- or concept 
potential. 
Disagreement regarding target-firm objective between fund and entrepreneur. 
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Annex 5 
 
Description of venture capital funds incorporated in the study 
Below follows a brief summary of the private venture capital funds included in the study to 
provide the reader with additional insight to the specific preconditions of the firms. 
 
Wingefors Invest is a private investment company founded in 2009 by Lars Wingefors. The 
Group's turnover in 2012 was SEK 469 million, and the equity was SEK 132 million. Their 
headquartered is located in Karlstad, Sweden. As a holding company, they have a long term 
investment horizon and they have no time frame for their investments or exit strategies.  The 
portfolio contains a wide range of companies within a broad range of branches. 
Via Venture Partners is a mayor player on the Nordic private equity market. They invest in 
companies of all sizes; their main focus is on smaller- to mid-sized companies (revenue from 
SEK 50 million to SEK 750 million). Founded 2006, Via Venture Partners is a privately owned 
and independent Nordic multi-stage private equity firm. Their Limited Partner in both their 
funds is ATP – Denmark’s largest pension fund with SEK 650 billion under management. 
STING Capital is a venture capital fund in Sweden that invests at the earliest stages of 
development most often before the companies have a finished product or paying 
customers. They are a commercial VC fund with investors both from the private and public 
sector. Sting itself is managing SEK 85 million but their business model enables partners to 
make co-investments. They are often the first external and they invest up to SEK 4 million per 
business. From 2012 STING Capital aims to invest in minimum 10 high-tech companies on a 
yearly basis. 
CapMan Plc is one of the largest private equity firms in the Nordic region, focusing on the 
Nordic market and Russia. Capman Plc is listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The 
company's main business is private equity fund management. CapMan's investment horizon is 
normally 3-6 years and they are mainly investing in well established companies and real-estate. 
The company manages more than SEK 30 billion in capital. 
SEB Venture Capital was founded in 1995, and has invested over SEK 3 billion in 
approximately 100 companies in total. At the moment they are active owners in 32 portfolio 
companies with a total turnover of SEK 2.6 billion. As part of SEB, they have a capital base 
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that sets them apart from many equity investors. They operate as an evergreen fund, which 
gives them the flexibility needed to focus on long-term value for their portfolio companies. 
EQT invests in companies across the world; EQT has four investment strategies –Equity, Mid-
Market, Infrastructure and Credit (which is excluded from the calculations). Nearly SEK 200 
billion has been raised from over 300 global institutional and professional investors and more 
than SEK 120 billion has been invested in 110 companies. EQT owns today around 50 
companies in a diversity of industries across the world. The most concrete result of the EQT 
business model is to increase portfolio companies’ earnings with 15% annually during EQT 
Equity funds’ ownership on an annual basis. 
Coeli Private Equity's mission is to offer its shareholders an investment opportunity in a 
portfolio concept based on Buyout funds that are not typically available to smaller investors. 
Coeli Private Equity starts a new “VC-fund” each year that mainly invests in other unlisted 
stocks. Today there are about 10 “funds” with a total of MSEK 1000 under management. 
Nordic Capital is a private equity investment firm focusing on leveraged buyout transactions 
mainly in the Nordic region. Nordic Capital invests across a broad array of industries and 
maturity. Nordic Capital is registered in Jersey but based in Stockholm, Sweden and was 
founded in 1989. The firm has approximately SEK 45 billion of capital under management. 
Since its establishment, Nordic Capital has acquired over 50 companies. 
